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BETWEEN TERROR AND RELIGION: PAVING WAYS TO 
SILENCING ARMS IN THE NORTH-EASTERN REGION OF 
NIGERIA
The growing influence of the insurgent group known as Boko Haram 
is a worrisome prospect for Nigeria. It appears that the insurgent 
landscape of the country will become more complex and threatening 
after the emergence of the Shekau Bin Abubakar-led Boko Haram 
insurgent group in the north-eastern region. Because Nigerian 
insurgents do not operate in isolation, it is natural for them to draw 
inspiration from the IS. As insurgent group prepare to enter into 
another phase of ideologically and operationally transformed jihadist 
discourse, the implications for Nigeria’s internal security are severe. 
Apart from security implications, this process will affect extremism 
discourse in the country and the behaviour of non-violent religious 
organisations. This article will explore how the widespread use of 
arms in Nigeria’s north-eastern region aggravates the problem of the 
safety and security of lives and property, undermining stable peace. It 
also suggests ways by which the critical challenges posed to human 
security in the region can be tackled in order to realise genuine 
religious tolerance and peace everywhere in the north-eastern region.
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Introduction
Since 2009, Nigerian religious leaders have announced a last push or critical 
event that will turn around the situation in Nigeria. Each time the underlying 
assumption is that, with increased resources and the right plan, the weaknesses 
of the Nigerian state can be tackled and stability achieved. Yet despite the latest-
and massive-military surge and accompanying ‘civilian uplift,’ the political 
and security situation has continued to deteriorate (Bamidele, 2014). The Boko 
Haram insurgent group has expanded their reach across the country from their 
strongholds in the north-eastern while the Nigerian public increasingly views 
the government of President Muhammadu Buhari as ineffective. Even under 
a reform-minded leadership, a self-sufficient central state that could provide 
security and justice for the people would take decades to build up. Within the 
2015 transition time, without basic political stability and in an environment 
dominated by increasingly self-serving religious elite, it is practically out of 
reach.
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In the current Nigerian context, reports of preliminary contacts 
between the federal government and the Boko Haram insurgent group have 
become a cause for optimism. A political settlement is needed, but at the same 
time, an exclusive deal between federal government and the Boko Haram 
insurgent group would be divisive, alienating civil society, minority groups, 
and other constituencies. If the international community wants to reduce its 
role by 2020 without further destabilizing Nigeria, it will need to work out a 
religious strategy to ensure that it does not become the guarantor of a deal that 
splits the country-or that sets the stage for renewed civil war. Boko Haram 
insurgency arising from the proliferation and widespread of arms is a severe 
challenge to human rights in the country. Since 1967-1970 civil war ended, 
the availability of existing arms together with the illicit trade of arms has 
exacerbated religious insurgencies in Nigeria. Nowhere is this truer than in the 
north-east region of Nigeria.
In the north-eastern region of Nigeria, the culture of impunity and the 
easy availability of arms diminish people’s capacity to be open and tolerant 
with each other. The possibility of religious insurgency is intensified by the 
poverty and corruption in the region, where underdevelopment is caused 
by corruption and the inequitable sharing of allocation belonging to the 
people. Not even the federal government that should mediate insurgencies 
has demonstrated any neutrality. It dispenses more violence invoking the 
bogey of national security. This undermines humanitarian principles and 
poses a challenge for governance, threatening the stability of the country and 
particularly the region. Peace and security is a sine qua non for stable peace in 
any society. Thus in the north-eastern region, where there is a large influx of 
arms and where peace and security are noticeably absent, there is a need for 
concerted analysis and action. This article is aimed at highlighting the need for 
balance in premises of understanding the causative factor that birth insurgent 
groups in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. This article will explore how the 
widespread of arms in Nigeria’s north-eastern region aggravates the problem 
of the safety and security of lives and property, undermining the prospects of 
religion tolerance and stable peace. It also suggests ways by which the critical 
challenges posed to human security in the region can be tackled in order to 
realise genuine religious tolerance and stable peace everywhere in the north-
eastern region of Nigeria. 
Geographical Description of North-Eastern Region of Nigeria  
The north-eastern region is one of the largest in the northern region of Nigeria. 
Covering Nigeria’s states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and 
Yobe states, while the region is generally known for its subterranean farming.
The region, which is the largest zone in Nigeria, was created as a regional 
government in 1967 and until 1976 when the region was split into Bauchi, 
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Borno, and Gongola states. In 1991, Yobe state was carved out from Borno 
state while Gongola was split into Adamawa and Taraba states which increased 
the number of states in the north-eastern from three to five. In 1996, Gombe 
state was created from the then Bauchi state making the numbers of the states 
to be six as it remains until this date. 
The region comprises six of the 36 states in the country which are 
Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe, along with 112 Local 
Government Areas. The nation’s north-eastern extends from latitudes 6 28” N 
and 13 44” N and longitude 8 44” E and 13 38” E. The last nationwide census 
of 2006 revealed the population of this region to be18, 984, 299 out of a total 
population of 140, 431,790 people in Nigeria; that is, 13.52% of the population 
of Nigeria lives in this region. The land mass of the region is calculated to 
be 272, 395km2 which is 29.54% of the total landmass of Nigeria. The relief 
of the region is divided into highlands and the plains. The highland area was 
described as mountainous, especially the Mandara Mountain (1200–1500 km), 
the Atlantika (1200 m), the Shebsi (1800 m) and the Biu hills.
The highland region is heavily dissected and many large areas are 
covered with volcanic lava. The plains with an average elevation of 300 m 
developed on young sedimentary rocks consisting mainly of clays with 
some sand horizons and gravels. The plains are usually seriously flooded 
during the rainy season. The region borders a transition zone (Sahelian strip) 
between the Savannah and the Sahara desert. Few trees such as thorny acacia, 
scattered gum, Arabic trees and date palms are available. Grasses grow to 
the maximum of one meter in the north but increase in quantity and height 
toward the south. The grasses serve as pasture to animals because most of the 
inhabitants are nomadic herdsmen. Rainfall ranges from about 1200 mm to the 
south to 500 mm in the north (Yadudu, 1992). These geophysical, geostatic, 
and geodynamic attributes affect farming, citing of industries, town planning, 
physical development, socialization, culture, livelihoods, employment, and so 
forth, of the people in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. 
In the north-eastern region, the inextricable link between the socio-
economic impacts associated with Sharia law and the control of the political 
positions accruing from it has precipitated varied and far-reaching religious 
and political insurgencies in which the widespread use of arms now represents 
a major problem. The region insurgency, within the broader rubrics of the 
struggle for power and imposition of sharia law, is particularly instructive in 
that it has prompted arms brokers and governments to push arms into the hands 
of non-state actors for personal gains, thereby granting impetus to the national 
surge in arms importation.
The region is at the epicentre of the numerous religious violent 
conflicts that are destabilizing the country today. From 2009 to the present, 
the manifestation of these religious insurgencies, which have reached crisis 
proportions, is a culmination of long years of neglect and of unstructured 
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and unpredicted Maitatsine religious struggles that started in the 1960s 
and continued to the 1980s (Yusuf, 2013). From the despair of violent 
religious protests, petitioning against conditions of poverty, corruption, and 
implementation of Sharia law, the struggles in the north-eastern states have 
risen, since the execution of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (the former leader 
of Boko Haram insurgents group), to the point of insurgency in which arms 
flow easily through the region’s labyrinthine network of porous borders and 
deserts in the region (Odhiambo, 2014). The religious violent character of the 
insurgency now includes the suicide bombing, cross-killing of state security 
forces and innocent citizens, and the unprecedented practice of hostage-taking 
in recent times.
While the Nigerian state has been primarily concerned with regime 
security, the extremists involved in the struggle are competing with the state 
for the implementation of Sharia law and enforcement of Islamic state. The 
determination of the extremists supports Ted Gurr’s (1998) postulation that 
men rebel when they are driven by the relative deprivation occasioned by the 
gap between expectation and actualization. Having suffered a lot of deprivation 
and unprecedented repression at the hands of the Nigerian state, the extremists 
in the north-eastern have demonstrated increasing willingness to resort to 
religious armed violence … using available weaponry (Muhammad, 2012). 
Needless to say, the growth of religious armed group in the north-eastern 
region is predicated on the emergence of a more generalised phenomenon of 
religious extremists such as Boko Haram insurgent group and similar groups 
which are often sponsored by highly powerful and influential religious leaders 
in the society. The widespread nature of the violent activities of this Boko 
Haram insurgent group is revealed in Onuoha’s (2012) estimation that Nigeria 
is home to a thousand arms.
The unfettered and unlimited access of the north-eastern states 
extremists to stockpiles of highly sophisticated and sturdy arms suggests their 
backing by networks of powerful and relatively rich religious leaders. While 
frantic efforts to uncover the identity of these religious financiers have not 
yielded any success, there is nevertheless a consensus about their existence. 
This is particularly evident in their ability to undermine the security mechanism 
in place as well as the highly rigid laws regulating the possession and use of 
arms in Nigeria (Firearms Regulations, 1990). The latter makes it unlawful for 
anybody to possess or operate a wide range of explosives, lethal weapons and 
ammunition without certification (Ibrahim, 2003). 
In explaining the source of the arms’ flow to the north-eastern states, 
the common position has been to point to political and religious leaders 
who have issued them to hired thugs to eliminate or maim perceived or real 
opponents. While there is an element of truth in this, in view of the high stakes 
and inordinate quest for political power and religious superiority among 
the political and religious class and the spate of high profile assassinations 
Between Terror and Religion: Paving Ways To Silencing Arms In The North-Eastern Region of Nigeria
Jebat  Volume 44 (1) (July 2017) Page | 167
associated with elections (especially those of 2007), the fact that the volatility 
of the north-eastern states crisis pre-dates the present democratic dispensation 
warrants other explanations. One can look further in tracing the influx of arms 
into the north-eastern states to local manufacturers, dubious arm dealers who 
make false declarations of contents in imported illicit goods, and smugglers 
who take undue advantage of the country’s porous borders. The region has 
a labyrinthine network of porous borders that facilitate the flow of arms. 
North-eastern security agents (both serving and retired) are also suspected of 
providing arms and training in their use to their religious extremists. As well, 
arms are re-cycled into north-eastern states of Nigeria from armed conflict 
states such as Mali, Libya, Chad, Niger.
While Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operations has afforded 
some unpatriotic elements who have served in missions abroad to smuggle and 
sell arms, others are involved in arms theft from the National Armoury. As far 
back as 1980, a customs official gave 16 G-3 rifles to some northern youths 
as part of his ‘contribution’ to the religious superiority cause (Ndime, 2005). 
Between 1980 and 1999, police and custom officials in Nigeria and Niger 
confiscated about 3,500 assault rifles, 80,000 rounds of ammunition, and some 
200 pistols from smuggling syndicates. Also seized around this period were: 
10 rifles and 10,000 rounds of ammunitions hidden in a vehicle travelling from 
Chad to the north-eastern region of Nigeria, 5 double-barrelled shot-guns and 
22,000 cartridges of live ammunition hidden in a trawler sailing from Mali to 
the north-eastern region of Nigeria (Bello, 2010). A further 3,000 rifles and 
7,000 rounds of ammunition on their way to the region were apprehended 
by guards at north-eastern region of Nigerian borders (Malam, 2014). While 
these cases are a little dated, the situation has been made worse by desperate 
extremists in the north-eastern region who continue to take undue advantage 
of the change precipitated by the return of the country to civilian rule in May 
1999. The boom which the arms-flows have brought to the black-market in the 
region is largely responsible for the religious superiority in all places ravaged 
by religious crises, including the region. For instance, it has been observed that 
herdsmen openly carry AK- 47 and automatic rifles (Bamidele, 2016).
Although investigation has confirmed that there is a correlation 
between north-eastern retired military officers from these feuding religious 
groups and training on the use of arms, other scholars argued that since the arms 
are light, insurgents in the north-eastern region learn to use them on their own 
through frequent handling and practice (Ibrahim, 2003; Nte, 2011; Anyadike, 
2013). The scenario in the north-eastern region where openly armed extremists 
patrol group territories demonstrates the extent to which arms have become 
a symbol of power, dominance and worth. Young extremists have grown up 
to believe that religious violence, especially through the use of arms, is the 
only way of gaining power, obtaining goods and services, and establishing 
respect, thus perpetuating the culture of religious violence (Anyadike, 2013). 
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It is common knowledge that in the wake of the escalation of religious violence 
in the north-eastern region, Nigerian state joint securities have not only armed 
private security personnel to render security services, they have also “reached 
an agreement with both federal and state governments to import arms and 
ammunitions for Nigerian troops (Olukayode and Kujenya, 2012). This is the 
context for the recent pronouncement by Nigeria’s President Muhammadu 
Buhari, during the swearing in headquarters in Abuja. In 2014, the former 
President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration approved $2.1 billion 
Arms deal to suppress the Boko Haram insurgent group in the north-eastern 
states, not to develop the region (Tori Nigeria News, 2015). This money can be 
channel to the development of the region because if the region is developed, 
the extremists will not carry guns.
Although the incumbent President (President Muhammadu Buhari) 
responded to the former President’s (Goodluck Ebele Jonathan) expose of the 
administration’s covert arms purchase by referring to the allegations as “reckless 
and barefaced lies” and a plan design to scuttle the transition programme, the 
fact that the statement came from such a high level makes it impossible to 
ignore (Okoro, 2015). Rather than take the incumbent President’s statement 
to mean that there can be a different approach to the north-eastern question, 
President Obasanjo revealed that:
We discovered that quite a number of extremist Islamist youths, 
running into thousands … are establishing camps…. They are also 
buying arms with a view to overawe the community, overawe the local 
government, overawe state government and overawe government of 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. No self-respecting government will 
allow criminality to overawe it (Nte, 2011). 
The above pronouncements, if anything, make the north-eastern region 
question a top election issue in 2015.
Challenges of Widespread of Arms in the North-Eastern Region
A critical look at the challenge of arms around north-eastern region of Nigeria 
makes one wonders if they are not the real weapons of mass destruction. From 
the conditions that precipitate their demand to the abuses that their availability 
facilitate, arms have proved a fundamental challenge to several north-eastern 
states since the demise of the Maitatsine religious crisis and Biafra civil 
war (Adesoji, 2010).  The Maitasine violence threatened the age old fragile 
inter-ethnic relationship between the Hausa-Fulani northerners and people of 
southern ethnic extractions in the north. And the relatively peaceful inter-faith 
cohabitation of the people of northern Nigeria, as non-members of the sect, but 
most especially Christians, were the targets of the violence. This blood lust was 
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tacitly supported by the northern political class who looked at their southern 
counterparts with the same level of hate and condescension. Although they 
do not cause insurgencies, their potential to fuel underlying tensions, deepens 
the sense of religious and political crisis, raising the number of casualties and 
generating more insecurity (George, 2002). Arms are cheap, readily available, 
easy to transport and difficult to control and monitor. Their portability and 
simplicity allow them to be used even by ill-trained people.
They have become the instruments of modern day religious violence in 
the north-eastern region of Nigeria, causing over half a thousand deaths a year. 
Beyond being an everyday phenomenon, the complete out-of-control status 
the proliferation of arms has assumed around states in the region has further 
exacerbated poverty and underdevelopment where they constitute a menace. 
There are 640 to 650 thousand imported and locally made arms circulating in 
the north-eastern region today and every year about three thousand new guns 
and 8 billion units of ammunition are import through the north-eastern borders 
from southern and northern American countries (Nte, 2011). Nte (2011) stated 
that “the death toll from arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems – and 
in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs. In terms of the 
carnage they cause, arms, indeed, could well be described as “weapons of mass 
destruction”.
Yet there are still no federal and state administrations to limit their 
spread. Added to the foregoing is the fact that a significant proportion of the 
trade in arms is conducted in secrecy. Besides being part of a wider trade that 
incorporates more lethal weaponry, the existing lack of control of the trend has 
not only caused the diversion of legally traded arms into the illegal sector, it 
has also reinforced an environment in which corruption and the black market 
thrive (Obasi, 2002). Thus from the hotbeds of armed conflicts in the West 
African states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire to the 
low intensity religious and political violence arenas of Niger, Mali and Chad, 
the record of religious and political crisis sustained by easy access to arms 
continues to pose serious challenges and vulnerabilities. This is the context in 
which the north-eastern region situation constitutes a special case. 
Arms, Religion and Insecurity in the North-Eastern Region
There are multitudes of extremists as well as regular government and private 
security personnel who take part in religious violence in the north-eastern 
region using imported and locally made arms. The dynamics of the interface 
between the struggle for power and the struggle for religious superiority 
tend to condition the nature, dimensions and magnitude of the proliferation 
of the illicit arms (Mustapha, 2014). While the option of religious violent 
confrontation may represent one of the ways in which people have chosen 
to express their disgust for the unhealthy development, hardship and misery 
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which infidel leaders has spawned, the Nigerian government’s resort to the use 
of violence – under the bogey of “national security” for the absolute protection 
of lives and properties to whom it is held captive as a rentier state – has 
worsened the conditions for internal violence, leading to the free flow of arms 
and, by extension, exacerbating the existing poverty and underdevelopment in 
the region (Ehindero, 2011).
Although there is the tendency to single out the north-eastern as 
Nigeria’s biggest arms problem, the legal and illegal circulation of arms has far-
reaching effects on religious violence and most especially on armed banditry, 
which is prevalent throughout the region. According to a study carried out by 
(Kukah, 1994), the failure of Nigeria’s government to implement arms control 
programs after the Maitatsine religious crisis of 1980s and after other political 
violent conflicts within the region thereafter is at the source of the country’s 
arms proliferation problem. The availability of arms in religious and political 
clashes has killed more than 10,000 Nigerians since 1990 i.e. an average of 
1000 people per year (Kwaja, 2008). Security forces are acquiring arms in a 
bid to live up to the demands of security in the country while individuals and/
or groups are buying arms because security forces are not up to task and also 
because of the benefits of carrying out political and religious violence (Keili, 
2008).
It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of arms in circulation in 
the north-eastern region as a whole and in Nigeria in particular. This is partially 
because of the extensive nature and the porosity of north-eastern Nigerian 
borders, corruptibility of the customs and security apparatus, incapability, lack 
of interest and will on the part of local government officials and politicians 
(Keili, 2008). But the main reason is poor record keeping in the hand of 
security agencies in Nigeria. Before 2002, the only data available was a semi-
official document stating that Nigeria’s citizens possessed approximately 
one million firearms (Obasi, 2002). ECOWAS Commission reported that 
the number of illicit arms in Nigeria ranges between one and three million 
(ECOWAS Commission, 2011). This number may seem small for a country 
counting up to 170 million inhabitants, but play a big role in religious crime, 
religious violence and insecurity in many parts of the country (Adele and Stott, 
2008). Arms have continued to play a very important role in religious violence 
and thus insecurity in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. Arms such as AK-
47 assault rifles, automatic pump-action shotguns, shoulder launched rockets, 
beretta pistols, Browning pistols, carbine rifles, double-barrel shotguns, G-3 
rifles, general-purpose machine guns, and sub-machine guns are widely 
in circulation in north-eastern region of Nigeria (Osman, 2010). Citing the 
ongoing of war against Boko Haram in the north-eastern region of Nigeria, a 
lot of arms has been recovered from the group (see Table 1). 
Since 1999, more than ten thousand Nigerians have lost their 
lives in religious conflicts which have been characterized by an increased 
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involvement of arms especially in the north-eastern region (Adejo, 2005). As 
it has already been demonstrated, arms are playing an ever increasing role 
in fomenting religious violence and insecurity in the region. They are used 
for criminal activities ranging from petty crimes, through more serious crimes 
like kidnapping taking up to ethno-political crisis, most especially for religious 
motivated killings around religion crisis periods. In a small scale study that 
was carried out by a group of researchers in a hospital in north-east region of 
Nigeria following the religious clashes of 1980 and 2007, it was observed that 
though the majority of casualties were  due to firearms, the majority of firearms 
victims sustained permanent disabilities (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). The study also 
revealed that most of the firearms victims were males which would suggest a 
considerable weakening of economic productivity, since women generally stay 
at home in the region (John et al, 2007).
Table 1: Major Rescue Operation of Civilian JTF with and without 
Special Military Joint Task Force (SMJTF) in North-Eastern Region 
involving Recovery of Arms from Boko Haram Group
Date Arms recovered from Boko Haram
August 2013 - 
December 2013
• In an another event in Zabarmari ward of Jere Local 
Government Area of Borno State, civilian JTF killed 




• In Gamboru, in another joint operation between 
civilian JTF group and SMJTF, they recovered 70 
motorcycles from Boko Haram terrorists and they 
also collected 2 Hilux vehicles and Armoured 
Personnel Carrier (APC) from them, while many Boko 
Haram terrorists were captured alive with several 
ammunitions recovered from them.
• In Biu Local Government Area, the civilian JTF 
captured 6 Boko Haram terrorists that camouflaged 
as Fulani herdsmen and they also recovered guns 
from them.
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January 2015 -
December 2015
• In Budun village, with another joint operation 
with the SMJTF, they were able to identify those 
places that the Boko Haram terrorists group hid their 
ammunitions and they recovered 65 AK47 and 8 
riffles from them.
• In Benesheik village, the civilian JTF group killed 
8 Boko Haram terrorists with their locally made guns 
and rescued 2 women and 7 children.
January 2016 - 
July 2016
• In a joint operation between civilian JTF group 
and the SMJTF in Dure village, the civilian JTF 
and SMJTF recovered 2 AK47 rifles, 2 locally 
Dane Guns, 3 AK47 Magazined with 38 rounds of 
ammunition. Those Boko Haram terrorists were 
killed along Rugga Fulani.
• In a similar operation from Wala, Durubajuwe and 
Rugga Fulani, the civilian JTF group and the SMJTF 
recovered 2 rusty General Purpose Machine Gun 
barrel, 3 grinding machine and 6 locally made Dane gun.
• In another joint operation between the civilian JTF 
groups and the SMJTF in Kudiye, Souma, Dika, 
Mijigeta and Mida, with the help of information from 
the civilian JTF, the SMJTF group recovered 7 rifles, 
47 motorcycles and killed 34 Boko Haram terrorist 
members and freed 387 hostages.
• In another joint operation called Operation Lafiya 
Dole (Peace by Force) initiated by SMJTF of the 
Nigerian Army and civilian JTF group, both group 
were able to discover the largest cache of arms and 
ammunitions hidden on the ground by Boko Haram 
terrorists in Brogozo-Alagarno area very close to 
Sambisa forest and both group recovered them.
• In another joint operation in Alagarno forest 
between the civilian JTF and the SMJTF. With the 
help of information from the civilian JTF, the civilian 
JTF group and the Special Military Joint Task Force
recovered another large cache of arms and 
ammunitions that power a battalion of solders which 
include 36 boxes of .51mm calibre, 5 x 20 Lyra 
beefcake mixture of 7.62mm (NATO) ammunition, 
large quality of 7.62mm (Special) ammunition and
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one 81mm mortar tube in Kadari, Camp Abu Fatima 
and Gursum villages.
• In another operation along Alagarno forest the 
civilian JTF group and the SMJTF in Kadari, Camp 
Abu Fatima and Gursum villages. With the effort of 
civilian JTF members, both group also recovered 2 
Toyota Hilux, 2 Generators and 68 motorcycles.
• In similar operation in Alagarno forest, the 
civilian JTF and the SMJTF were able to rescue and 
recover 27 motorcycles, 12 vehicles, 9 AK47 rifles, 
3 Fabrique Nationale rifles, a Sniper rifle, fabricated 
rocket bomb, 5 locally made Dane guns, solar panels 
and more than 20 persons under the custody of Boko 
Haram terrorists were released.
• In Dikwa local government area of Borno, the 
civilian JTF group and the SMJTF of 112 
Battalion recovered large cache of weapons and 
medical facility which include from Boko Haram 
Camp fuel dump, Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs), mechanical workshop machines, a large 
numbers of generators and waterpumps while more 
than 56 Boko Haram terrorist members were killed.
• In another village very close to Dikwa local 
government area, in another operation involving the 
civilian JTF and the SMJTF, both groups  were able 
to recover another  set of 4 vehicles loaded with IED 
medical facilities, mechanical workshop machines 
and generators and fuel dump. In the operation more 
than 37 Boko Haram terrorists were killed and more 
than 56 were wounded.
• In a joint operation involving the civilian JTF 
group and the SMJTF of 192 Battalion in Kusarha-
Zalidava village. Both the civilian JTF group and 
the 192 Battalion killed 5 Boko Haram terrorists and 
they recovered a belt of 7.62mm (NATO) ammunition 
containing 42 rounds, 2 General Purpose Machine 
Gun (GPMG) with registration number FN 132125 
and many 7 Boko Haram terrorists were killed.
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The researchers however concluded that the low numbers of patients 
affected by arms usage was an under representation of the real picture because 
in a place like north-east region, it is generally considered futile to take people 
with gunshot wounds to hospital because of the lack of money and also because 
of the conviction that the victim will die anyway. In addition, custom and 
tradition dictates that a person be buried immediately after they are confirmed 
dead and thus Muslim victims are not taken to hospital.
Finally, poor record keeping and inadequate available data, incorrect 
coding and incomplete files decrease the reported incidence (Ocheche, 2005). 
Between August 1980 and June 2014, more than 30 incidents of religious 
crime were reported in the local newspapers. More than 9 of these were carried 
out with firearms, 34 with other tools and 2 even involved bombs (Ibrahim, 
2003). In these incidents, a total of hundred people while other were reported 
missing (Ibrahim, 2003). Bearing in mind that this local news was carried out 
on reported in the real arms harm is much higher. They also observed that 
the biggest negative impacts were suffered by unarmed citizens while armed 
perpetrators did not incur as much serious consequences. The end result is that 
unarmed civilians, the majority of the Nigerian population in the north-eastern 
region live in perpetual fear and cannot count on the forces of law and order 
to guarantee a minimal security. And because the latter are incapable and/or 
unwilling to deliver, the whole situation becomes a vicious cycle as citizens 
seek to protect themselves from becoming victims through other means. 
Some turn to forming vigilante groups or arming themselves with arms as the 
only way of fighting against armed robbers and thereby contributing to arms 
proliferation and the cycle of religious violence that breeds and sustains fear 
and insecurity. Arms have made religious extremists in the region much easier 
for the perpetrators, more lethal for the victims and more complicated for law-
enforcement officers to apprehend the extremists with devastating effects on 
the economy, politics and social life.
There is also the question of the human development cost of arms, 
especially as they do damage to infrastructure, displace people and cause 
decline in economic activity. The negative impacts of religious conflicts 
and the highhandedness of an increasingly militaristic federal government, 
along with the increasingly daring posture of the Islamic extremists, all using 
arms to settle their religious conflicts arising from the inequality and relative 
deprivation, will only further exacerbate the core problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment in the north-eastern region. 
Concluding Remarks: A Collective Resolution
Religion is a major factor in the conflicts and threats of war in any society. 
Superiority and discrimination in religious group often create patterns and 
feelings of marginalisation. For a society that is used to settling even the most 
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minor dispute with arms, it should be expected that religion could spawn and 
sustain major conflicts. The fact that arms have done and continue to do more 
harm than good to north-eastern region and Nigerian society in particular. 
Thus several attempts have already been made to address the issue more or 
less successfully. However, the fact that the problem still remains prevalent 
on the region means that the steps taken were not effective, not far-reaching 
enough or may still require some time to bear fruit. In order to make valuable 
recommendations for effective future action, it will be necessary to take 
a glimpse at some of the most important measures that have already been 
taken by the federal government of Nigeria to solve the arms problem. This 
is obvious in the case of Nigeria’s north-east region where the superiority and 
discrimination in religious group has generated an on-going problem of Boko 
Haram insurgent group made worse by unregulated use and easy access to 
arms. The foregoing notwithstanding, there are opportunities for the realisation 
of a north-eastern that is free from the proliferation and use of arms: First, the 
government should create the necessary conditions for the genuine dialogue 
required for the resolution of the parlous state of underdevelopment which 
led to the violence in the region. Although the past civilian administration 
has made some major policy interventions in the north-east question such 
efforts have become a hollow, time-wasting, television show, where serious 
contributions are ridiculed and participants are harangued and shouted down 
by an all-knowing and comical moderator. 
Second, the federal government should demonstrate genuine 
commitment to stop the flow of arms in the north-eastern. For instance, while it 
is true that Nigeria has established a national committee on the implementation 
of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Small Arms, indications are that the 
efforts made so far lack strategic coordination and consistent implementation 
(ECOWAS Commission, 2006). Thus, beyond the mere signing of the 
ECOWAS principle not to allow importation, exportation and manufacturing 
of arms, the government should strengthen its control over arms in its armoury 
and work out necessary measures that would guarantee border security with 
its neighbours. 
Third, it is necessary to ensure that only the Nigerian army is deployed 
to the north-eastern region of Nigeria to keep peace. Even then, it should be 
the duty of the federal government to ensure that those that are so deployed 
act professionally and in accordance with international standards. Fourth, 
there is a need to ensure that concrete steps are taken to get private companies 
in the region to operate within the framework of international best practices 
by protecting the region and to promote community development projects 
following the principles of corporate social responsibility. Such efforts should 
include a comprehensive road network that would open up the region and 
promote infrastructural transformation. 
Finally, as a matter of urgency, there is a need for job creation to 
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guarantee the socio-economic security of the vast army of jobless youth in the 
region. This step, apart from helping to give the desired sense of belonging and 
partnership to the Nigerian project, would also help to anchor the north-east 
states policy in a political process that stresses human capital development and 
security rather than the one that attempts to foist dubious law and order upon 
the population. As the country talks about local content in the industrial sector, 
the principle should be taken to a level that provides training in industry-
related skills and enables these extremist youth to find relevance in the fight 
against the proliferation and use of arms and that finally allows the north-
eastern region to achieve its full potential.
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